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CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA, INC.
v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
91 E 3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996).
I. FACTS
The City of Philadelphia (City) and intervening
defendant United Minority Enterprise Associates (UMEA)
appealed from -t2e district court's judgment declaring
that the City's set-aside program for black construction
contractors, Chapter 17-5001 violated the equal protec-
tion rights of the Contractors Association of Eastern
Pennsylvania (CAEP) and eight other contracting associ-
ations (Contractors) .2
The preamble to Chapter 17-500 set forth general leg-
islative findings, including the percentage of minorities in
Philadelphia. The legislature found that "[a] pattern of past
and present racial, sexual and economic discrimination have
unfairly limited the ability of Minority and Female Owned
Businesses to compete for an equitable share of such con-
tracts with the City of Philadelphia"; that the citizens of
Philadelphia are committed to the eradication of such dis-
crimination; that goals for minority and female owned busi-
nesses would help eradicate the manifestations of discrimi-
nation.3 The preamble to the 1987 ordinance, which extend-
ed the life of the program, included the finding that econom-
ic parity with majority businesses had not yet been reached.'
Chapter 17-500 seeks to increase the participation of
"disadvantaged business enterprises" (DBEs) in city con-
tracting.5 DBEs are defined as those business at least 51%
owned by "socially and economically disadvantaged" per-
sons.6 "Socially and economically disadvantaged persons"
are "individuals who have ... been subjected to racial, sex-
ual or ethnic prejudice because of their identity as a mem-
ber of a group of differential treatment because of their
handicap without regard to their individual qualities, and
whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has
been impaired due to diminished capital and credit oppor-
tunities as compared to others in the same business area
who are not socially disadvantaged."7 This definition
'Phila. Code § 17-500 et. seq.
2Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. City of Philadelphia,
91 E3d 586, 590-91 (3d Cir. 1996).




7Id. (quoting Phila. Code § 17-501011).
"includes only individuals who are both the victims of
prejudice based on status and economically deprived."'8
Businesses majority-owned by racial minorities (minority
business enterprises or MBEs) and women are rebuttably
presumed to be DBEs, per § 17-501(1 1)(a), but businesses
that have received more than $5 million in City contracts
are rebuttably presumed not to be DBEs. 9 Chapter 17-500
sets the participation goals of: 15% for racial minorities,
10% for women, and 2% for handicapped.' These pere-
centages include the dollars received by DBE subcontrac-
tors as well as the monies granted to DBE prime contrac-
tors.II
Two different strategies are authorized to achieve
the program's goals. 12 When there are sufficient DBE's
qualified to perform a city contract to ensure competi-
tive bidding, a contract can be let on a sheltered market
basis - i.e., only DBE's will be permitted to bid.3 In
other instances, the contract will be let on a non-shel-
tered basis - i.e., any firm may bid - with the goals
requirements being met through subcontracting. 
4
Because the sheltered market strategy has seldom been
used, the Ordinance's participation goals have been
achieved almost entirely by insisting that bidding prime
contractors subcontract work to DBE's in accordance
with the goals.'5 Chapter 17-500 is, therefore, essentially
a subcontracting set-aside program.'6
When the goals are to be achieved by imposing sub-
contracting requirements, each would-be prime contrac-
tor must submit a "Schedule for Participation" of DBEs or
a "Request for Waiver."7 A schedule lists the participating
DBE subcontractors and the dollar value of their ser-
vices, whereas a waiver is a way to avoid the DBE
requirements. 8 The Request for Waiver lists the DBEs
they have commitments from and contains a statement
that the contractor has made a good faith effort to enlist




"Id. The 1982 Ordinance created the Minority Business
Enterprise Council (MBEC) to oversee the program. Id. The
MBEC also had the power to recommend exemptions from











Compliance with the Chapter 17-500's goals is to be
considered "an element of responsiveness" of the bid
when an agency awards a contract.20 When at least one
bidding contractor submits a satisfactory Schedule for
Participation, it is presumed that all contractors who did
not submit a satisfactory Schedule did not exert good
faith efforts to meet the program goals, and the "lowest
responsible, responsive contractor" who is granted a
Waiver and proposes the highest level of DBE participa-
tion at a reasonable price recieves the contract.21 The pre-
sumption can be rebutted by noncomplying bidders.
2
II. HOLDING
After trial, the United States District Court issued a per-
manent injunction against the enforcement of the ordi-
nance. 23 The United States Court of Appeals for the 3rd
Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Philadelphia.2 4 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Judge Stapleton held that the city failed
to demonstrate race-based discrimination on the part of
general contractors or local trade associations.As to the city,
the set aside program was not narrowly tailored to address
such past discrimination even if it could be shown."
III.ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
In evaluating the Philadelphia program, the United
States Court of Appeals applied the strict scrutiny test artic-
ulated in Wygantla and Croson.I Wygant held that parties
challenging a race-based preference can succeed by show-
ing either (1) that the subjective intent of the legislative
body was not to remedy race discrimination in which the
municipality played a role, or (2) that there is no strong
basis in evidence for the conclusions the race-based dis-
crimination existed and that the remedy chosen was nec-
essary'm Croson held that municipal, race-based, affirmative
action programs, when challenged on equal protection







"Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267
(1986).
'7City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469
(1989).
"Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277.
"Croson, 488 U.S. at 470.
30Id.
"Contractors, 91 F3d at 599.
321d.
33Id.
In Croson, the Supreme Court stated that, in order to
pass the strict scrutiny test, a minority set-aside program
must be justified by a compelling government interest
and narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial pur-
pose."°The strict scrutiny test requires that the City must
specifically identify the discrimination giving rise to the
compelling state interest in a race-based classification.3
Over the course of the litigation, the city pointed to
three distinct forms of discrimination, discrimination by
prime contractors in the awarding of subcontracts, dis-
crimination by contractor associations in admitting
members, and discrimination by the City in awarding of
prime contracts.
32
The Contractors Court found no firm evidence of dis-
crimination in regard to the prime contractors or contrac-
tor associations." To show discrimination by the city, at
trial, it relied upon a study by Dr. Andrew Brimmer.
3
1
According to Brimmer's analysis,"black construction firms
would have to have received approximately 4.5 times
more public works dollars than they did receive in order
to have achieved an amount proportionate to their repre-
sentation among all construction."31 He arrived at that fig-
ure by calculating a disparity index of 22.5 for black con-
struction firms."According to Dr. Brimmer, the smaller
the index figure, the greater the inference of discrimina-
tion.17 He concluded that such a large disparity was




In certain circumstances, a disparity index of 22.5
can constitute a strong basis in evidence for inferring the
existence of discrimination. 3 The district court, howev-
er, rejected Dr. Brimmer's conclusion for three reasons:
it did not take into account whether the black construc-
tion firms were qualified and willing to perform City
contracts; it used mixed statistical data from different
sources; and it did not account for the "neutral" explana-
tion that qualified black firms were too preoccupied
with large, federally-assisted projects to perform City pro-





7Disparity index formula: ($ to MBE's / $ on all prime con-
tracts) x 100 / (# MBE's / total # of contractors) = Index.
'Contractors, 91 F.3d at 595.
3See Associated General Contractors of Cal. v. Coalition
for Economic Equity, 950 E2d 1401,1414 (9th Cir. 1991) (find-
ing disparity equivalent to index of 22.4 sufficient to raise infer-
ence of discrimination), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct.
1670, 118 L.Ed.2d 390 (1992); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough
County, 908 E2d 908, 916 (11 th Cir.) (finding disparity equiva-
lent to index of approximately 50 sufficient to make a prima
facie case), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 983, 111 S.Ct. 516, 112
L.Ed.2d. 528 (1990).
"'Contractors, 91 E3d at 602-03.
Court's first two contentions and said the third was a
close call.4" They did not decide on the third contention,
however, because they found that the program was not
narrowly tailored to remedy the discrimination, assum-
ing they could find discrimination.42
To the extent that the evidence suggests racial dis-
crimination has occurred, it suggests that the City dis-
criminated against black prime contractors capable of
bidding on prime City construction contracts.43 To be
constitutionally permissible, the program must be nar-
rowly tailored to address the discrimination shown, i.e.,
the remedy chosen must have been made necessary by
that discrimination." Consequently, in so far as the pro-
gram affects the subcontracting market, it is not narrow-
ly tailored to address discrimination by the City in the
market for prime contracts."
The District Court found, and the record supports,
that prior to adopting Chapter 17-500, the City Council
never attempted to determine the scope of the injury it
was allegedly seeking to remedy.46 The legislative history
suggested that the benchmarks for the program were
derived solely from the general population of minorities
and women in Philadelphia.4 7 The Third Curcuit conclud-
ed that the City was never able to provide an evidentiary
basis from which to conclude that the 15% set-aside was
necessary to remedy discrimination against black con-
tractors in the market for prime contracts.48 The Brimmer
Study actually suggested that, at most, only 0.7% of the
construction firms qualified to perform City-financed
prime contracts in the pre-ordinance period were black
construction firms.
49
In finding that the Richmond program was not nar-
rowly tailored, the Croson Court considered it significant
that the race-neutral remedial alternatives were available
and the City did not consider using these means to
increase minority business participation in City con-
tracting.50 The district court here, likewise, found that
there were race-neutral alternatives that would likely
contribute to the alleviation of the perceived problem .
5
The Court considered such alternatives important as
their use would reduce the hardship to non-minority
contractors. 52 The Third Curcuit concluded that there
was ample support for the finding that alternatives to
race-based preferences were available at the time the leg-
islation was passed that would have been race neutral or,
at least, less burdensome to non-minority contractors.
5 3
IV. CONCLUSION
In Hunter v. Regents of the University of
California,5 4 the U.S. District Court stated that in
Contractors, the Third Circuit based its holding on an
intepretation of Croson previously rejected by the
District Court in California.5 5 They claimed that because
the Supreme Court stated that strict scrutiny is not "strict
in theory, but fatal in fact," there must be other constitu-
tional means of race-conscious decisionmaking besides
56
simply remedying past discrimination.
The Hunter Court seems to assume that the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny review is fatal to affirmative action
programs. Strict scrutiny review, however, only requires
legislators and policy-makers to more carefully craft pro-
grams which attempt to redress discrimination. The pro-
gram, according to Contractors, must specifically address
demonstrated discrimination. Additionally, Contractors
suggests that race-neutral alternatives must be considered.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Steven White
"1Id. at 599.
2 d. at 605.
43Id. at 606.
"Id. at 605 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 510).
45Id. at 606.




"Contractors, 91 E3d at 607.
'9 d.




"Hunter v. Regents of the University of California, 1997
WL 429051 (C.D. Cal.). To be reported at: 971 ESupp. 1316
(C.D.Cal 1997).
"Hunter, 1997 WL 429051 at 9.
6Id.

